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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2000, Enron Corporation's reported net income was an
impressive $979 million' and it allegedly produced $5.3 million in
revenues per employee.2 Given these seemingly fantastic figures, David
Rynecki, writing on behalf of Fortune Magazine, declared Enron one of
the "10 stocks to last the decade."3 However, little more than a year
passed before Fortune's prophesy proved to be horribly wrong.4 On
December 2, 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy, 5 and approximately one
year later, USA Today estimated the sizable damage-over $63 billion
in losses-to shareholders since Enron's bankruptcy filing.6  Enron's
stock, once worth $83 per share, was worth a trifling 67 cents per share
just over a year later, a decrease in value of approximately 99.2%. 7 As
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, a law professor at the University of Tennessee
described the situation, "'[it was not the end of innocence. It was the
chastening of stupidity . . . people should have known better."'
8
Similarly, two commentators aptly analogized that "Enron sank like the
1. The Enron Scandal by the Numbers, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2002, at B3
[hereinafter USA TODAY], available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/energy/2002-01-
22-enron-numbers.htm (providing estimates of various matters relating to the "Enron
scandal" including change in stock prices, company ranking and other descriptive figures).
2. David Ackman, Enron the Incredible, FORBES.COM (Jan. 15, 2002),
http://www.forbes.com!2002/01 / 15/0115enron.html (comparing Enron's financial
statements to other publicly traded companies).
3. David Rynecki, 10 Stocks to Last the Decade, FORTUNE, Aug. 14, 2000, at 114,
available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2000/08/1 4/285599/index.htm
(advising readers regarding market trends and providing stock suggestions).
4. See Peter Grier, Enron 's Effect: Corporate Life a Year Later, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Dec. 5, 2002), http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1205/pO1 s02-usju.html
(reflecting on the aftermath of the Enron and the changes in the corporate marketplace a
year later).
5. Id.
6. USA TODAY, supra note 1.
7. USA TODAY, supra note 1.
8. Grier, supra note 4.
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Titanic."9
In the wake of Enron, the public and Congress began to question
whether auditor independence, as it stood, could be relied upon to
ensure the accuracy of public company financial statements. 10 They
were concerned that allowing audit firms to provide other non-audit
services to clients, especially consulting services, may undermine
auditor independence. 1" As commentators argued, "an economic bond"
cements between the auditor and its client when the auditor performs
lucrative non-audit services, like consulting, for its client.' 2 In the case
of Enron, it compensated its accounting firm, Arthur Andersen LLP, for
consulting and auditing services, paying Andersen $27 million and $25
million for these services, respectively.' 3 When the tawdry details of
Enron's accounting practices were revealed, reformists emphasized the
need to prevent auditors from also providing consulting services to
clients. 14  This reformist concern was consistent with some earlier
criticisms, which noted that when an audit firm receives significant
revenues from a client for performing nonaudit services, the fear of
losing these funds undermines auditor independence and professional
skepticism. 15
Witnessing the turmoil created by the fall of Enron, the House
of Representatives investigated ways to increase the oversight of the
accounting industry and to protect future shareholders from similar
losses.' 6 Ultimately, Congress adopted "[a]n Act to protect investors by
9. Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron's Reporting of
Revenues and Key Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS 97, 99 (Rapoport & Dharan eds., 2004), available at
http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-bala/files/dharan-bufkins-enron-redflags.pdf (examining several
of Enron's major red flags which emerged prior to its filing for bankruptcy).
10. See Enron Case Reflects Questions About Auditors' Independence, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Feb. 13, 2002, at A21 [hereinafter Enron Case Reflects Questions] (discussing
former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt's testimony before the Senate Banking Committee's
hearing regarding accounting practices in the aftermath of Enron).
1I. See id.
12. See Deborah L. Lindberg & Frank D. Beck, Before and After Enron: CPAs' Views
on Auditor Independence, 74 THE CPA J. 36, 37 (Nov. 2004) (discussing surveys of CPAs
regarding auditor independence administered shortly before and after the revelation of the
Enron scandal).
13. Enron Case Reflects Questions, supra note 10, at A2 1.
14. See id.
15. See Lindberg & Beck, supra note 12, at 37.
16. See Accounting Regulatory Overhaul: Hearing on H.R. 3763, Corporate Auditing
Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act (CAARTA) Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Serv., 107th Cong. 2 (2002) (opening Statement of Rep. Oxley, Chairman, H. Fin. Serv.
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improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes" (Sarbanes-
Oxley) to more closely regulate corporate audits.1 7 The creation of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board) was
the prominent feature of Sarbanes-Oxley, with its duty to "protect the
interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of
informative, accurate, and independent audit reports" through its powers
as a public regulatory organization. 8 However, Sarbanes-Oxley also
required the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate the
wisdom and viability of mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) and to
provide Congress with its findings by July 30, 2003.19 MAFR, at its
simplest, would require "a limit [to be placed] on the period of years in
which a particular registered public accounting firm may be the auditor
of record for a particular issuer.'' 20  In the late summer of 2011, the
PCAOB renewed the discussion of MAFR by requesting public
comment on the potential effects of such a requirement on the auditing
industry and public companies. 21 The comment period was extended by
the PCAOB to November 19, 2012.22 The PCAOB does not expect to
undertake additional regulation, if any, until 2013.23 Thus, the
accounting industry and the public companies they serve are left in an
Comm.) [hereinafter Accounting Regulatory Overhaul] (discussing the impetus for
CAARTA and providing an overview of the legislation).
17. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(implementing federal regulation of public companies).
18. See id. § 101, 116 Stat. 745, 750 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006)); see also
Press Release, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., PCAOB Announces Panelists and
Schedule of Appearances for October 18 Public Meeting on Auditor Independence and
Audit Firm Rotation (Oct. 15, 2012), available at
http://pcaobus.org/News/Releases/Pages/10182012_PublicMeetingPanelists.aspx.
19. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 207, 116 Stat. 745, 775
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7232 (2006)); see generally U.S. GOV'T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-04-216, REPORT TO THE S. COMM. ON BANKING, Hous., AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND THE
H. COMM. ON FIN. SERV.: PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS REQUIRED STUDY ON THE POTENTIAL
EFFECTS OF MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION (2003).
20. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 207(c), 116 Stat. 745, 775
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7232(c) (2006)).
21. See Concept Release on Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation, PCAOB
Release No. 2011-006, 3 (Aug. 16, 2011) [hereinafter PCAOB Release No. 2011-006],
available at http://pcaobus.org/RuleslRulemaking/Docket037/Release_2011-006.pdf.
22. Press Release, supra note 18.
23. See Kathleen Hoffelder, No Fuss Audit Rotation Alternatives Floated, CFO.coM
(July 25, 2012), http://www3.cfo.com/article/2012/7/auditing-mandatory-audit-rotation-
pcaob-sarbanes-oxley-gao?currpage=2 (discussing potential alternatives to MAFR).
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uneasy standstill-will the PCAOB choose to implement MAFR, and if
so, what would the ramifications be to the accounting industry and
public companies?
This paper address these questions and asserts that MAFR
should not be undertaken without additional research into the effects of
MAFR, culminating in a more measured and critical examination by the
PCAOB and accounting industry of MAFR's costs and benefits. Part II
of this paper discusses the purpose of auditors and the history of
MAFR.24 Part III addresses the PCAOB's August 2011 Concept
Release, which seemingly reinvigorated the public discourse on the
costs and benefits of implementing MAFR This Concept Release is
the first stage of the process the PCAOB uses in creating new
standards. 26  Part IV examines the proposed theoretical benefits of
MAFR and contrasts these with the overwhelming costs associated with
the implementation of MAFR.2 7 Finally, Part V provides a brief
overview of some of the proposed alternatives to MAFR.28
II. THE ROLE OF AUDITORS AND THE HISTORY OF MAFR
A. The Role ofAuditors
Understanding the role of the corporate auditor is necessary to
determine whether MAFR should be implemented. Auditors are
independent accounting professionals whose purpose is to ensure that
the information provided to the public by the management of public
companies is a thorough and accurate reflection of each company's
business affairs.2 9 The fundamental goal of the audit is to provide the
public with a reliable assessment of the company's financial position.3°
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part III; see also PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, supra note 21, at 1.
26. See Protecting the Public Interest Through Audit Oversight: 2011 Annual Report,
PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., 13 (2011), available at
http://pcaobus.org/About/Ops/Documents/Annual%20Reports/2011 .pdf [hereinafter 2011
Annual Report] (discussing the process through which the PCAOB implements new
standards. After a general "notice-and-comment" period, the Board proposes standards in a
public meeting, which are then subject to the approval of the Securities and Exchange
Commission).
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Part V.
29. See PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, supra note 21, at 15.
30. See id. (citing Memorandum by the JAG Subcommittee on Global Networks and
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To achieve these ends, three requisite characteristics of the auditor are
frequently cited: "independence, objectivity, and professional
skepticism.' '3' Even in early auditor accountability discussions during
the 1970s, it was generally assumed that the public expected
accountants to take an active role in critically examining financial
statements of companies, to promote truthful financial disclosure, and to
"exert surveillance over management., 32 In fact, many people perceived
fraud detection, in itself, to be one of the key purposes of corporate
audits.33 Public perception of reliability is important because investor
confidence declines when "users of the financial statement information
do not perceive that the auditor was independent in appearance."
34
As Representative Oxley described in his testimony before the
Committee on Financial Services in 2002, creating a public company
regulatory system which bolsters public confidence in corporate
financial statements is integral to a well-functioning marketplace.35
Auditors are expected to truly be "public accountants," protecting the
people from corporate malfeasance by performing their oversight duties
to "the highest standards of competence, independence, and ethical
conduct., 3
6
B. The History of MAFR
Congressional concerns regarding auditor independence and the
truth of corporate financial statements date back to the 1970s.37 Why,
Audit Firm Governance, 8 (Mar. 16, 2011), available at
http://pcaobus.org/News/Events/Pages/0316201 1_IAGMeeting.aspx).
31. Cynthia Fornelli, Center for Audit Quality, PCAOB Public Meeting on Auditor
Independence and Audit Firm Rotation, 2 (March 22, 2012), available at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/psFornelli.pdf (written statement
regarding MAFR prepared for the PCAOB public meeting).
32. See THE COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES: REPORT, CONCLUSIONS,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-2 (1978) [hereinafter Cohen Commission Report], available at
http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/
1970/1978_0101 _CohenAuditors.pdf (discussing the role of the auditor and responsibilities
in producing financial statements).
33. See id. at 2.
34. Lindberg & Beck, supra note 12, at 36.
35. See Accounting Regulatory Overhaul, supra note 16.
36. Id.
37. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT OF THE S.
COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., THE ACCOUNTING ESTABLISHMENT, iii (Comm.
Print 1976) [hereinafter Metcalf Report] (indicating the commission of a congressional
2013]
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then, has it taken over three decades for MAFR to be seriously
considered as a method of regulating public company audits? Some
suggest that the strong opposition from corporate Chief Financial
Officers (CFO) underlies the delay, as MAFR "[causes CFO] blood to
boil., 38  The history of MAFR and the language of Sarbanes-Oxley
suggest an equally plausible theory: Congress did not want to
implement MAFR without adequately examining the benefits and
repercussions of such regulations. 39
1. The 1970s, Growing Concerns Regarding Auditor Independence
In 1977, the Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and
Management of the Committee of Government Operations published a
staff study titled, "The Accounting Establishment," commonly referred
to as the "Metcalf Report., 40 Senator Metcalf, writing to the Chairman
of the Senate Government Operations Committee, Abraham Ribicoff,
discussed the "continual revelations of previously unreported
wrongdoing by major corporations, as well as a series of corporate
failures and financial difficulties" as the impetus for the subcommittee's
study.4 1 In the study, the Committee encouraged Congress to evaluate
various ways to foster competition among audit firms, particularly when
vying for hire by large companies.42 The study continues:
Long association between a corporation and an
accounting firm may lead to such close identification of
the accounting firm with the interests of its client's
management that truly independent action by the
accounting firm becomes difficult. One alternative is
mandatory change of accountants after a given period of
years, or after any finding by the SEC that the
study in 1976 regarding concerns over financial statement reliability, which illustrates the
discussion of MAFR concerns for almost 40 years); see also PCAOB Release No. 2011-
006, supra note 21, at 10 (indicating that the report is frequently referred to as the "Metcalf
Report.").
38. Hoffelder, supra note 23.
39. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 207, 116 Stat. 745, 775
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7232 (2006)).
40. See Metcalf Report, supra note 37, at Il.
41. Id.
42. See id at 21.
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accounting firm failed to exercise independent action to
protect investors and the public.
43
However, aside from this limited discussion and foreshadowing
of MAFR proponents' arguments, the Committee made no substantial
recommendations regarding the viability of MAFR.44
2. The Involvement of the Accounting Industry and the Report of the
Cohen Commission
At the time the Metcalf Report was published, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) had already created
its own auditing oversight commission.45 The Cohen Commission
served two fundamental purposes: (1) examining the duties of
independent auditors; and, (2) determining whether there is a difference
between the scope of these duties and the public's perception of the
scope of these duties.46 Although its members began meeting in 1974, a
final report from the Commission was not made available until 1978.47
However, even prior to the publication of the Cohen
Commission's findings, Congress expressed its skepticism about the
neutrality of the Cohen Commission.48 As the Metcalf Report notes,
"[Il]ike the previous AICPA study groups, the Cohen commission is
comprised entirely of representatives from large accounting firms, large
law firms, large investment firms, large corporations, and academic
accountants, some of whom have ties to the 'Big Eight. 49
Additionally, the Metcalf Report reiterated its concern that the
Cohen Commission was funded by the AICPA, an obvious advocate for
auditing firms.50
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Cohen Commission Report, supra note 32, at xi.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. See Metcalf Report, supra note 37, at 119.
49. Id.
50. See id. Though the Metcalf Report makes an important point regarding the
potential for bias in the Cohen Commission's report, alternatively, these industry
representatives were also likely some of the most capable persons to analyze auditor
accountability, given their positions in major firms and their breadth of accounting
knowledge and experience.
20131
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Nonetheless, in its report, the Cohen Commission highlighted
the importance of "an independent audit" due to the "inherent potential
conflict between the entity's management and the users of financial
information."51 Similarly, the Commission emphasized that when done
properly, an audit ensures that corporate managers have conformed to
their responsibilities.52  After reviewing the concept of MAFR, the
Cohen Commission argued that MAFR's benefits would be
counteracted and outweighed by the costs of such a regulatory
scheme.53 Additionally, the Commission posited that the gains of
rotation are more easily and economically attainable, simply by rotating
the audit employees assigned to a particular client company, with such
employment subject to the constant oversight and management
discretion provided by the audit committee of the client company's
board of directors.54
3. Sarbanes-Oxley
To protect shareholders and manage the economic fallout of the
Enron scandal, in 2002 Congress decided that "important changes" were
necessary to safeguard auditor independence and reliable financial
reporting, as such concerns "have percolated for some time [and]
the bankruptcies of Enron, Global Crossing, and others have pushed
them to the forefront. ' '55 Accordingly, in the House of Representatives,
Representative Oxley sponsored and advocated for the Corporate and
Auditor Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002
(or CAARTA).56 CAARTA offered a variety of provisions to increase
auditor independence.57  Among them, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission was tasked with reviewing accountants issuing
certain types of financial statements and with the responsibility of
creating a public regulatory organization to promulgate accounting
rules, enforce securities laws and regulations, and review audit firms for
51. See Cohen Commission Report, supra note 32, at 5 (emphasis added).
52. See id.
53. See id. at xxx, 108-09.
54. See id.
55. Accounting Regulatory Overhaul, supra note 16.
56. Id.
57. See Corporate Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act
("CAARTA"), H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002) (discussing various auditing reforms).
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auditor independence.58
When CAARTA was discussed before the House Financial
Services Committee, Representative Oxley proposed major changes in
federal securities laws to "[enhance] the public's faith in financial
statements," while remaining balanced and "[avoiding] the temptation
some apparently feel to blanket market participants in a sea of red
tape."59  Instead, Representative Oxley highlighted the Committee's
choice to address auditor accountability concerns in a more measured
fashion. 60
In his remarks, Representative Oxley particularly emphasized
the testimony of then-Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, and
reiterated "the markets' self-correcting mechanism... underscore[s] the
danger of overreacting to the Enron matter.",61 However, he endorsed
change to protect investment, as "America does not tolerate cheats. 62
Despite CAARTA's steps toward greater auditor oversight, some, like
the Washington Post in its editorial "Mr. Oxley Punts," were critical
that provisions for mandatory audit firm rotation were absent from the
reforms posed by CAARTA.63
Meanwhile, the Senate examined ways to reform the accounting
industry, with the goal to promote auditor independence and
objectivity.64 The Senate's initiative, spearheaded by Senator Sarbanes,
resulted in the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs drafting of the Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act of 2002 (Act).65 Among other things, this Act
required the Comptroller General to complete a study of the costs and
benefits of implementing MAFR.66 A call for research of MAFR
58. Id.
59. Accounting Regulatory Overhaul, supra note 16.
60. See id.
61. Id (emphasis added).
62. Corporate Accounting and Disclosure Rule Revision: Hearing on H.R. 3763,
Corporate Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act (CAARTA) Before
the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 107th Cong. 2 (March 20, 2012).
63. See Editorial, Mr. Oxley Punts, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2002, at A28 (analyzing
CAARTA provisions).
64. See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 1 (2002) (discussing auditor accountability and
financial statement reliability to further explain S. 2763 107th Cong. (2002), the senate bill
discussing the same issues).
65. S. 2673, 107th Cong. § 2, 77 (2002).
66. Id.
20131
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ultimately became part of Sarbanes-Oxley.67
In addition to initiating the GAO study and creating the
PCAOB, Sarbanes-Oxley implemented mandatory audit partner
rotation. 68 Conceptually similar to MAFR, audit partner rotation
prevents an audit partner from overseeing a company's audit if the
partner has worked on the company's audit anytime in the prior five
fiscal years.69
4. The GAO Report
The research performed by the General Accounting Office
(GAO) in 2003 and provided to the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Financial
Services ultimately determined that MAFR "may not be the most
efficient way to strengthen auditor independence and improve audit
quality., 70  In reaching this conclusion, the GAO divided its
investigation into three areas.7 I First, the GAO examined previous
research relating auditor independence and audit quality for an audit
engagement to the audit firm's tenure on the engagement. 72  This
research included studies which examined the potential pros and cons of
implementing MAFR.73 Second, the GAO used its findings from
reviewing prior research to actively engage industry participants in
discussion and analysis of the costs and benefits of MAFR.74 In
particular, the GAO: (1) created its own questionnaires to distribute to
audit firms, chief financial officers, and audit committee chairs,75 (2)
67. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 207, 116 Stat. 745, 775
(2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7232 (2006)) (requiring a study of MAFR).
68. Id. § 203, 116 Stat. 745, 773 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006)).
69. Id.
70. U.S. GOv'T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at "What GAO Found."
71. Id. at2.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 2-3.
75. Id. at 3-4 (2003). It is important to note that many of the surveyed industry
participants did not respond to the GAO's request for information. The GAO organized the
responses into three "Tiers" ultimately basing its findings in this study on the survey results
obtained from the "Tier 1" group. See U.S. GOv'T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19,
at 3-4 & n.5. This "Tier 1" group included 97 participants which audited 10 or more SEC
registered public company clients in 2001. Id. at 3. For its surveys of public company chief
financial officers and audit committees the GAO engaged a statistical random sampling
technique. Id. at 4. Although the GAO sampled several different subgroups, due to
[Vol. 17
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facilitated discussions with "interested stakeholders" regarding MAFR,
and (3) examined MAFR as implemented in other countries.7 6 Finally,
the GAO examined Fortune 1000 companies' financial restatements
arising from "errors or fraud., 77 The purpose of this analysis was two-
fold: (1) to document if restatements of company's financial statements
were more common when company's engaged a new audit firm, and (2)
to determine whether any increase in restatement filing is attributable to
a "fresh look" by the new audit firm at the company's financials.78
The majority of survey respondents in the subgroups examined
and "other knowledgeable individuals" indicated that the benefits
attributed to MAFR will be obtained through the reforms already
required by Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC, namely audit partner
rotation.79 The GAO argued that prior to implementing MAFR, the
results of the already enacted requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley should be
examined by the SEC and PCAOB. 80 As the GAO notes, the SEC and
PCAOB need to give these reforms sufficient time to be implemented
and examined in order to make an informed decision about whether
additional reform, such as MAFR, is required to secure audit quality.
8 1
The GAO emphasizes the importance of efficiency, highlighting that
other reforms, including those already in place, may have effects similar
to those under an MAFR regime without the additional MAFR costs.
82
The PCAOB itself admits in its Concept Release regarding MAFR that
"the Board believes that the reforms in the Act have made a significant,
positive difference in the quality of public company auditing."
83
Additionally, the GAO provides a refreshing dose of realism noting that
MAFR "is not a panacea that totally removes the pressures on
auditors." 84 The concerns with MAFR expressed historically by the
insufficient participation, the GAO ultimately relied on the survey results from one sub
group for its study, a group containing 201 responses from 330 Fortune 1000 (a 60.9%
response rate). Id.
76. Id. at 2-3.
77. Id. at 3-4.
78. U.S. Gov'T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 3.
79. Id. at 5; see infra footnote 75 (providing more information on survey respondent
classification).
80. Id.
81. See id. at 8.
82. Id.
83. PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, supra note 21, at 2.
84. U.S. GOV'T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 8.
2013]
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Cohen Commission, in the Sarbanes-Oxley hearings, and in the GAO
report remain relevant to our current discussion of the wisdom of
implementing MAFR.
III. THE PCAOB's 2011 MAFR CONCEPT RELEASE
The PCAOB was established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
to oversee the audit of public companies that are subject
to the securities laws, and related matters, in order to
protect the interests of investors and further the public
interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and
independent audit reports for companies the securities of
which are sold to, and held by and for, public
investors.85
In addition, the PCAOB is charged with the duty to "establish or
adopt, or both, by rule, auditing, quality control, ethics, independence,
and other standards relating to the preparation of audit reports for
,,86issuers.
The PCAOB requires that all accounting firms which provide
audit reports to public companies register with the Board. 87 The Board
annually inspects audit firms that audit over 100 public companies.8 8 In
2011, the PCAOB reviewed 340 audits across 10 firms which met the
PCAOB's requirement for annual inspections.8 9 Firms which do not
meet the criteria for annual inspection are inspected, at minimum, once
every three years. 90 The Board also investigates certain auditors which
are auditing entities located abroad.91
85. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101(a), 116 Stat. 745,
750 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). The language
provided here is the language from the original public law. The amended language in 15
U.S.C. § 7211 (2006) contains the same essential elements.
86. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101(c), 116 Stat. 745,
750 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
87. See 2011 Annual Report, supra note 26, at 4 (discussing the duties of the PCAOB
and reviewing the agency's involvement overseeing audit firms in the past year).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id. at7.
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The PCAOB's inspection of audit firms is multifaceted, with the
Board reviewing parts of the firm's work product, its quality control
system, and its adherence to standards of professional conduct and other
rules and laws.92 In determining which subset of audits to inspect, the
Board takes a holistic approach, examining many factors including the
character of the firm and the Board's findings in previous inspections of
this auditor.93 After creating a report summarizing the investigation, the
Board releases certain information regarding the investigation to the
public, while allowing the audit firm one year to privately correct issues
with the audit discovered by the Board.94 If the Board finds an audit
firm violated an obligation, it may also discipline the firm; penalties
include barring an audit partner from practicing or fining the firm.
9 5
MAFR is a particular concern for the PCAOB because of the
"significant inherent risk" associated with asking audit firms to
independently examine their income source, the client.96 The PCAOB
fears that auditors will be unable to make the difficult choice between
their responsibility to shareholders and the pressures exerted by
management of the public company, particularly noting that an auditor
may be unaware of her predisposition to favor management. 97 In fact,
the PCAOB suggests that these relationships may already be causing
adverse effects on audits, as the PCAOB has mounting concerns
regarding "both the frequency and the type of audit deficiencies" it
encounters during the course of its inspection duties.98 In particular, the
PCAOB has found evidence during its inspections that it believes
reveals a decline in auditor objectivity and independence in evaluating
clients.99 To summarize, the PCAOB is concerned with the risk of
conflicts of interest existing when client companies pay audit firms to
evaluate them and when lengthy audit firm tenures are used as "long-
term income stream[s]."' '  The PCAOB suggests that these issues
result in decreased auditor independence, and as a result, lesser audit
92. See id. at 5.
93. See 2011 Annual Report, supra note 26, at 5.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 18.
96. PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, supra note 21, at 4.
97. See id. at 9.
98. Id. at 5.
99. See id. at 2.
100. See id. at 4, 9.
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quality.101
Although the PCAOB expressed its desire for comment from the
public regarding MAFR, it openly asserted its opinion that MAFR could
increase auditor accountability.' 0 2  The PCAOB's method of
presentation of the MAFR discussion, in itself, provides an indication
that the Board is strongly considering the implementation of MAFR
requirements. However, the PCAOB is not the only organization with
an opinion on the matter; in response to the PCAOB's comment request,
the Board received nearly seven hundred statements over the course of
approximately a year. 10 3  The sheer volume of the response to the
Board's Concept Release suggests the need for careful study and
reflection on the costs and benefits of MAFR prior to implementation of
a regulatory scheme to implement MAFR.
IV. THE THEORETICAL BENEFITS, AND THE UNDENIABLE COSTS, OF
MAFR
A. The Speculative Benefits of MAFR
Though a variety of arguments have been posed in favor of
MAFR over the years, three arguments, in particular, warrant further
discussion: (1) the "fresh eyes/fresh look" argument;10 4 (2) the "auditor
coziness" argument; 10 5 and, (3) the "watchdog" argument. 0 6 Although
presented as distinct arguments, an underlying and relatively simple
premise seems to run through each: new auditors are more independent
and critical of public companies than current auditors.
101. See id. at 2, 5.
102. See PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, supra note 21, at 9.
103. PCAOB, Comment Letters for Docket 037, http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking
/Pages/Docket037Comments.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2013).
104. SeePCAOB Release No. 2011-006, supra note 21, at 2, 11, 12, 14, 17, 38.
105. See id. at 15.
106. See e.g. Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and
Other Public Companies: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 107th Cong. at 347-48 (2002) (statements of John Biggs, President of TIAA-CREF)
[hereinafter Accounting Reform and Investor Protection] (indicating that Arthur Andersen,
the accountant for Enron, would have been more likely to challenge management regarding
accounting practices and would have had more incentive to thoroughly document deals if it
knew another auditor would be reviewing the audit in the near future. Biggs testimony is an
exemplar of the watchdog argument.).
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1. Seeing the Audit through "Fresh Eyes"
The Cohen Commission report, though it did not endorse
MAFR, recognized that one of the main arguments cited in favor of
MAFR is that it would usher in "a fresh viewpoint[]" to review the
public company.'0 7  Similarly, the 2003 GAO report to Congress
regarding MAFR stated that when certain negative trigger factors exist
suggesting potential auditor impropriety, audit committees "need to be
especially vigilant in the oversight of the auditor and in considering
whether a 'fresh look' (e.g., new auditor) is needed."108 The GAO cites
a 2003 report by the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and
Private Enterprise supporting this position and outlining trigger factors
which should spawn voluntary rotation. 10 9 In discussing the merits of
MAFR, the Conference Board Commission touts several benefits of
voluntarily rotating audit firms, noting that firm rotation allows for
candid evaluation of three key areas: (1) the financial reports of the
public company; (2) the accounting procedures utilized by the public
company; and, (3) the audits and associated materials actually
performed by the prior audit firm." 0 The specific trigger factors which
might warrant such a review by the audit committee include, as follows:
(1) the audit firm has been employed by the company
for a substantial period of time - e.g., over 10 years; (2)
one or more former partners or managers of the audit
firm are employed by the company; and (3) significant
non-audit services are provided to the company - even if
they have been approved by the audit committee." 11
According to the Conference Board Commission, after
examining these conditions, and potentially others, the audit committee
may believe that rotation of the audit firm would bolster shareholder's
107. Cohen Commission Report, supra note 32, at 108.
108. U.S. GOV'T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 9.
109. See U.S. Gov'T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 9.
110. See THE CONFERENCE BD. COMM'N ON PUB. TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (PART 2: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & PART 3: AUDIT AND
ACCOUNTING) 34 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/confboardcptpe.pdf
(analyzing and recommending best practices for corporate governance).
111. Id. at 33-34.
2013]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
perception regarding the validity of the company's financial statements
and the audit.11
2
The "fresh-eyes" argument has been studied, to some extent, in
the real world. 1 3 As the GAO notes in its report to Congress, the forced
dissolution of Arthur Andersen, LLP in 2002 led to other Tier 1 firms
taking over the audit responsibilities of approximately 1,200 public
companies. 1 4  Examining various SEC forms and subsequent
restatements of the applicable subgroup reviewed by the study, the
GAO determined that among the selected companies, the restatement
rates resulting from "errors or fraud" after hiring a new audit firm
totaled "10.7% in 2001 and 3.9% in 2002."l 1" 5 Conversely, companies
which did not rotate their audit firm experienced restatement rates of
"2.5% in 2001 and 1.2% in 2002. " 1 6 Though the GAO offers this data
as potentially persuasive research showing that "fresh look[s]" really do
uncover mistakes and fraud under a MAFR-comparable scenario, the
GAO stops short of making such a resounding conclusion." 7 In fact, it
specifically highlights that the change in the percentage of restatements
observed may be due to the "fresh look" or an array of other factors."
18
Without further research, it is impossible to specifically identify the
reasons for the restatements. 19
2. The Perils of "Auditor Coziness"
During the committee hearings for CAARTA, concerns over
auditor coziness between Enron and Arthur Andersen were made a
major focus in the testimony of then-Chairman of the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission Harvey Pitt.120 For example, Representative
Ney posed the following question:
112. See id.
113. See U.S. GOV'T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 46.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 46-47.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 47.
118. Id.
119. See U.S. GOv'T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 47.
120. See Accounting Standards and the Enron Collapse: Panel I of a Hearing of the
House Financial Services Committee, 107th Cong. 12 (2002).
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Mr. Pitt, could you give your view on how accounting
firms maintain their independence of their auditors when
members of their firm work for years with the same
company? And what I'm trying to get at is a question I
had asked in an earlier hearing a few weeks ago, I raised
the issue about how Andersen employees were
intertwined with Enron. They were actually mistaken
for Enron employees. They even went as far as to wear
Enron golf shirts and went on Enron retreats. And some
of the people thought they were Enron employees. So,
could you tell us, in your opinion, if the reforms
proposed in H.R. 3763 or the reforms you suggested will
ensure independence of future auditors-not just with
golf shirts, but, you know, mistaken identity? 2 '
Similarly, in its Concept Release the PCAOB points to the
testimony of the Investor Advisory Group (IAG)122 highlighting that
one of the greatest threats to the independence and professional
skepticism of an auditor is the degree of "coziness" exhibited between
firm management and the independent auditor.1 23  In support of its
assertion, IAG stated that many of the major companies associated with
financial scandals had remained with the same audit firm for extensive
periods of time. 124 The GAO found that, on average, Fortune 1000
public companies retain their auditors for approximately twenty-two
years.1
25
It is argued that lengthy audit firm engagement may also create
an environment where the auditor feels pressure to please the client.
126
Long audit tenure is like an annuity which offers up a consistent source
of future income-the prospect of losing this income stream, it is
121. Id.
122. PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, supra note 21, at 15.
123. See Memorandum from the Inv. Advisory Grp. Subcomm. on Global Networks
and Audit Firm Governance 6, available at
http://pcaobus.org/News/Events/Documents/0316201 IAGMeeting/SubcommitteeMemo.
pdf (discussing auditor independence in financial reporting).
124. Id.
125. See U.S. Gov'T GEN. ACCoUNT. OFFICE, supra note 19, at 6.
126. See Barbara Arel et al., Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality, 75 CPA J. 36, 38
(Jan. 2005) [hereinafter Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality] (examining arguments for
and against audit firm rotation).
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argued, may undermine auditor independence and professional
skepticism. 127 Given the often substantial tenure of audit firms with
particular clients, this concern over auditor coziness has been cited as
potentially "the most compelling argument in favor of audit firm
rotation."'
128
3. The "Watchdog" Argument
In discussing auditor independence, the PCAOB cites the U.S.
Supreme Court's discussion of the auditing profession and the Court's
assertion that independent auditors function as a "public watchdog."'
' 29
A similar "watchdog" type argument is discussed in relation to MAFR,
when commentators suggest that indicia of auditor independence
increase when accountants fear being criticized by another auditor for
doing allegedly erroneous or fraudulent work.130  As John Biggs,
President of TIAA-CREF, described to the Senate during its hearings
post-Enron, the expectation that an auditor's work is going to be
reviewed in the near future by a competitor can provide the needed
"bite" to curb potential auditor misbehavior: 131
Had Arthur Andersen in 1996 known that Peat Marwick
was going to come in in 1997, there would have been a
very different kind of relationship between them and
Enron. Clearly, they would have wanted to have their
work papers in order, all of the deals documented and
well explained. They might well have challenged
Enron's management in that early period where Enron
was changing its accounting.... I would think that there
is a very high probability that had rotation been in place
at Enron with Arthur Andersen, you would not have had
the accounting scandal that I think we have now .... 132
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, supra note 21, at 4 (quoting U.S. v. Arthur
Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984)).
130. See Accounting Reform and Investor Protection, supra note 106, at 347-48.
131. Id. at 348.
132. Id. at 347-48.
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This "watchdog" theory has garnered some academic support.
A 2006 study found that auditors are more likely to report a material
misstatement against the client's wishes when audit rotation is pending
than when the auditor relationship is ongoing and not constrained by
MAFR. 133 However, caution should be used when relying on this study
due to its experimental design. Rather than examining how auditors
reacted in past real-life scenarios, the study asks its CPA subjects to
"estimate" how their firm would respond if the experiment were real. 134
Common sense indicates that "estimating" how an auditor would
respond to a conflict of interest is not the same as seeing how the
auditor actually responded to a conflict. Accordingly, this study should
be given limited weight by regulators in evaluating the empirical
underpinnings of the watchdog argument.
B. The Recognized Costs of MAFR: The General Arguments
Against Implementation
There are three general arguments posed by the AICPA and
Center for Audit Quality (CAQ), an independent advisory group against
implementation of MAFR.
First, as the AICPA highlights, the PCAOB emphasizes auditing
errors it uncovered in accordance with its auditor inspection and review
duties, 135 but then it (the PCAOB) never actually provides a causal
connection between the audit failures identified and "a lack of auditor
objectivity and professional skepticism."'1 36  This concern over a
missing causal link or understanding of the "root cause" is echoed by
the CAQ, which spoke out against MAFR in its public comment letter
to the PCAOB. 13
7
133. See Barbara Arel et al., Findings on the Effects of Audit Firm Rotation on the
Audit Process Under Varying Strengths of Corporate Governance, 22 ADVANCES IN
ACCOUNTING 1, 2, 22 (2006).
134. Id. at 2.
135. See PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, supra note 21, at 5.
136. Letter from the Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants to the Office of the Sec'y
of the Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 1 (Dec. 12, 2011) available at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/413_AICPA.pdf [hereinafter Letter from
the Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants) (arguing against implementation of MAFR).
137. See Letter from the Ctr. for Audit Quality to the Office of the Sec'y of the Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 8 (2011), available at
http://pcaobus.org/Rutes/Rulemaking/Docket037/519_CAQ.pdf [hereinafter Letter from the
Ctr. For Audit Quality].
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Second, as the AICPA implies in its letter, there is a distinct
difference between identifying problems or concerns with auditor
independence and identifying solutions to those problems. 3 ' The
AICPA, likely expressing the view of many in the industry, argues that
MAFR is not at present the solution to the obstacles preventing
optimum auditor "independence, objectivity and professional
skepticism."' 39 In its letter to the PCAOB, the AICPA advocates for the
Board to show reliable empirical evidence linking MAFR to improved
audit quality, 140 particularly evidence capable of overcoming several
studies of MAFR which suggest that "mandatory firm rotation may
have an adverse impact on audit quality."'14 1 The CAQ provides a
concise summary of the problem, as follows:
While we are wholly committed to improving audit
quality, we do not see any evidence that MAFR would
result in direct and measurable improvements in audit
quality, and we believe that such a mandate would have
far-reaching, costly, and unintended consequences, not
only for auditors and audit firms, but for public
companies, audit committees, and investors. 1
42
Third, before implementing additional rules, it is sensible for the
PCAOB to examine the current rules and regulatory system for their
overall effectiveness-how else can you determine if the newest
reforms improved the regulatory system? 143  For instance, the CAQ
points out that, beginning in July 2009, the PCAOB promulgated nine
"significant new professional standards that are likely to have an
important effect on audit quality," but has yet to decide if there is still a
problem and to evaluate the effectiveness of recent reforms.'
44
Additionally, the Board's 2011 audits under these new standards had yet
138. See Letter from Am, Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, supra note 136, at 1.
139. Id. at 1-2.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
142. Letter from the Ctr. for Audit Quality, supra note 137, at 8-9.
143. See Letter from the Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, supra note 136, at 4-
6.
144. Letter from the Ctr. for Audit Quality, supra note 137, at 8.
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to start at the time public comment began on MAFR. 145 The PCAOB
needs to adequately address these general concerns prior to
implementing MAFR regulations.
Other nations have implemented MAFR schemes, among them
Italy, India, Brazil, Singapore, and Spain. 146 Examining the effects of
MAFR in Spain from 1988 to 1995 provides a helpful case study for
predicting the costs and benefits of MAFR implementation in the
United States. 
147
Spain repealed MAFR less than a decade after its
implementation. 148 When comparing auditor independence during the
MAFR period to the five years immediately thereafter (years 1995 to
2000)149 for 1,326 "financially distressed" clients, researchers
concluded there was "no evidence" indicating that auditors were more
inclined to provide a qualified audit opinion during the MAFR
period. 150  Additionally, the audit "annuity" argument expressed by
proponents of MAFR 151 did not come to fruition in Spain-researchers
determined that there was not a "signification association" linking
auditor independence to the "economic dependence" of the auditor to
the client, regardless of whether examining the MAFR period or the
unregulated period.
52
Perhaps even more interesting is the researcher's conclusion that
in realty, MAFR may actually decrease an auditor's desire to strive for
a reputation for audit quality and auditor independence. 153  The
researchers believe this result occurred because traditional "market-
based mechanisms," which previously encouraged auditors to foster
reputations for quality, lose effectiveness when MAFR is
implemented.154 The researchers summarize that in the MAFR program
145. Id. at 8.
146. Emiliano Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., Does Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation Enhance
Auditor Independence? Evidence from Spain, 28 AUDITING: A J. OF PRAC. & THEORY 113,
113-14 (2009) (evaluating the effects of MAFR in Spain, though never strictly enforced).
147. Id. at 114-15.
148. Id. at 115.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 116.
151. See Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality, supra note 126, at 36, 38 (see infra p.
20 for previous discussion of the annuity argument).
152. Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., supra note 146, at 116.
153. See id. at 132.
154. See id.
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implemented in Spain "mandatory rotation not only fails to enhance
auditor independence, but may in fact harm independence."'' 55 Another
study indicates that when there is a system of mandatory rotation
auditors lose the motivation to promote an independent reputation
because "rotation 'drastically limits the possibility of economically
realizing a substantial part of the reputational capital of the audit
firm."",156 Thus, the empirical analysis of Spain seems to run directly
counter to the "watchdog argument" of MAFR proponents;' 57 auditors
operating under MAFR regulations are/appear less concerned with
reputation. 158
C. The Recognized Costs of MAFR: The Specific Arguments
Against Implementation
1. MAFR undermines the power of the Audit Committee
One of Congress's chosen methods of protecting auditor
independence was through its mandate that public companies each
create an audit committee to choose the appropriate auditor for its
company.159 As the AICPA argues,' 60 and as the language of Sarbanes-
Oxley plainly states, Congress chose to place the "appointment,
compensation, and oversight" of the audit firm squarely within the
hands of the audit committee, rather than making an outright mandate of
auditor rotation. Additionally, these auditors are required to be
independent, based on criteria provided in Sarbanes-Oxley, including
restrictions on compensation of audit committee members and
prevention of members being "an affiliated person of the issuer or any
subsidiary thereof."'' 62 The AICPA suggests that the audit committee, in
addition to examining qualities of an audit firm like "reputation" and
155. Id.
156. Id. at 113, 117 (citing Arrufiada, B., and C. Paz-Ares, Mandatory Rotation of
Company Auditors: A Critical Examination, 17 INT'L REV. OF L. AND ECON. 31, 55-56
(1997)).
157. See Accounting Reform and Investor Protection, supra note 106, at 347-48.
158. See Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., supra note 146, at 132.
159. See Letter from the Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, supra note 136, at 4.
160. See id.
161. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-76
(codified at 15 U.S.C. 78j-1 (2006)).
162. Id.
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"industry experience," should consider the firm's tenure with the
company when evaluating the appropriate audit firm for the company.
163
The AICPA asserts that the audit committee should be allowed to
perform as Congress intended. 164 However, MAFR would inhibit the
audit committee's discretion in choosing the most suitable audit firm for
the company's needs.'
65
Concerns regarding the role of the audit committee are shared
by others in the field. The GAO emphasized the importance of the audit
committee 166 in explaining why MAFR "may not be the most efficient
way to strengthen auditor independence and improve audit quality."',
67
As the GAO stated:
We also believe that if audit committees regularly
evaluated whether audit firm rotation would be
beneficial, given the facts and circumstances of their
companies' situation, and are actively involved in
helping to ensure auditor independence and audit
quality, many of the benefits of audit firm rotation could
be realized at the initiative of the audit committees
rather than through a mandatory rotation
requirement. 16
8
It is critical that the PCAOB not implement regulatory schemes
which would hinder the intent of Congress in providing oversight power
to individual audit committees.
2. MAFR will lead to the appointment of less-qualified, less-expert, or
less experienced audit firms
Depending on the type of audit required, particularly in certain
geographic locations, finding a suitable audit firm may become
incredibly difficult under MAFR, if not impossible, due to the limited
163. See Letter from the Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, supra note 136, at 4.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See U.S. Gov'T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 9.
167. Id. at "What GAO Found."
168. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
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number of proficient firmS. 169 Additionally, companies that require
specialized audits may currently incur significant costs finding
appropriate audit firms, which would likely be exacerbated under
MAFR if firms cease specialized operations for lack of business under a
rotation regime. 70 For example, a survey completed by the Business
Roundtable found:
[a]ll of the companies responding to our Survey noted
that they engage one of the Big Four audit firms for
auditing services. . .. [N]early all of the companies
responding to our Survey indicated that they would have
difficulty finding a replacement audit firm with an
absence of independence issues, sufficient geographic
presence, and the necessary expertise to replace their
current auditor, with nearly sixty percent noting that it
would involve "significant difficulty., 171
The CAQ also highlights these concerns noting that MAFR,
when imposed on the already inherent structural difficulties audit
committees face finding suitable audit firms, might in reality have the
opposite effect of what the PCAOB desires. 72 Instead of promoting a
high quality audit, CAQ argues that the actual result may be that the
auditing industry is unable "to develop and retain specific competencies
such as industry expertise."' 173 As one commentator noted, the problem
of finding an adequate auditor will be greatest for those companies in "a
niche industry ... [with] a global reach."' 174
This sentiment is echoed by the Independent Directors Council
(IDC) regarding the audit of investment funds, one such niche
169. See Letter from the Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, supra note 136, at 3.
170. See id.
171. Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chair, Corporate Governance Comm., Bus.
Roundtable, to the Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2 (July 17, 2012) [hereinafter Letter
from Alexander M. Cutler], available at http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking
/Docket037/669_Business_Roundtable.pdf (discussing the costs to the accounting industry
of implementing MAFR).
172. See Letter from the Ctr. for Audit Quality, supra note 137, at 9-10.
173. Id.
174. Wayne R. Pinnell, How 'Mandatory' is Mandatory Auditor Rotation?, 27 FIN.
EXEC., Dec. 2011, at 15.
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industry.175 The IDC highlights that there are few firms that are
sufficiently independent and proficient to effectively audit an
investment fund. 176 The IDC points to data which indicates that four
accounting firms, as of December 2011, provide auditing services for
94% of funds, totaling approximately 99% of assets in the investment
fund industry. 177 It cautions that MAFR should not be used as a tool for
allowing smaller firms to "compete" for the opportunity to audit fund
financial statements because "these firms currently do not have the
expertise and experience typically necessary to audit fund financial
statements."178
Additionally, the IDC argues that any assertions that these small
firms could reach the necessary standards are "speculative" and would
entail considerable costs to the company. 179  Some academics have
stressed a similar concern that "non-Big Four firms" may not only be
lacking the skill necessary to perform extensive SEC audits, but also
may not desire to take on the burdens of such an audit. 8 °
3. "Fresh eyes" encounter substantial "learning curves"
Audit quality may improve as the auditor's tenure increases. 181
The AICPA touted one study which indicated that:
[A]udit quality "tends to improve rather than worsen
with tenure, providing support to the expectation that
there is a significant learning process for the auditor,
i.e., an auditor needs time to get to know sufficiently
well the business of the client and consequently, audit
175. See Letter from the Indep. Dirs. Council to the Office of the Sec'y of the Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd. 5 (Dec. 14, 2011) available at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037
/402_IDC.pdf (discussing the concerns of the investment fund directors to MAFR
implementation).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 6.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality, supra note 126, at 39.
181. See Letter from the Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, supra note 136, at 2
(citing Mara Cameran et al., Auditor Tenure and Auditor Change: Does Mandatory Auditor
Rotation Really Improve Audit Quality? (2010) (unnumbered working paper) (Bocconi
Univ. and IE Bus. Sch.).
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quality tends to increase over time."'1 82
For example, in a study analyzing the probability of fraudulent
financial statements based on the length of auditor employment for a
subset of New York Stock Exchange listed companies, research
indicated that as audit firm tenure increases, the likelihood of fraudulent
financial statements decreases! 83 As the researcher noted, this finding
undercuts arguments that lengthy audit tenure leads to increased
fraudulent reporting.' 84  Other research also indicates that under our
current system, lengthy audit tenure does not lead to declining earnings
quality in financial reporting.' 8
5
In a review of Australian listed firms from 1995 to 2003
analyzing the actual quality of the audit (as opposed to the perceived
quality of the audit), 186 researchers determined that audit quality does
not decline as audit firm tenure increases.187 As they describe it,
[W]e conclude that there are minimal, if any, benefits of
imposing mandatory audit firm rotation onto Australian
firms. Further, given the costs involved in switching
auditor, it does not appear that mandatory audit firm
rotation would be beneficial to the market. In order to
address the concerns that have arisen recently around
auditor independence and audit quality, other initiatives
are more likely to have a greater impact than imposing
mandatory audit firm rotation. 
88
As the GAO noted in its 2003 study, it is important to remember
182. Id.
183. See Nashwa George, The Relationship Between Audit Firm Tenure and
Probability of Financial Statement Fraud, 9 J. OF ACAD. OF BUS. AND ECON. 54, 2 (original
pagination not retained) (Apr. 1, 2009) (providing statistical analysis of the likelihood of
financial statement fraud in relation to the length of audit firm engagement with a client).
184. Id. at 10.
185. See James N. Myers et al., Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship
and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation?, 780 THE ACCOUNT.
REvIEw 779, 780-81 (July 2003) (arguing that earnings quality is related to audit quality and
can be used as a metric for studying the effects of rotation).
186. See Andrew B. Jackson et al., Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality,
23 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 420, 424, 434 (2008).
187. Id. at 433.
188. Id. at 433-34.
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that a new auditor's learning curve "can last a year or more."'1 89
Additionally, where "matters of professional judgment" are involved as
opposed to "actual errors," the "fresh eyes" leaming curve may result in
new auditors behaving in "an overly aggressive manner" due to lack of
institutional knowledge. 190 Moreover, extreme learning curve
difficulties may be encountered as the PCAOB seeks to impose a
MAFR system on top of the current audit firm partner rotations
system. 191
4. Increased auditing costs
The PCAOB admits in its concept release that growing "audit
costs may be a consideration that merits particular discussion during a
period of economic weakness and heightened global competition. ' 92
Estimating the cost of lost efficiency is difficult, although it is not
unreasonable to assume that as new auditors are rotated into an
unfamiliar company, this may lead to higher costs. 1 93 These costs may
include increased hours required of the client's personnel, increased
hours of the auditor, and generally more lengthy audit periods.
194
Though estimates of the exact costs vary, one survey provided during
the PCAOB's public comment period by the Business Roundtable found
that responding member companies that had experienced firm changes
in the last decade had each accrued costs for such audit firm rotation
estimated in a range from $500,000 to in excess of $5 million.1 95
Additionally, the GAO survey indicates that "[n]early all Tier 1
firms estimated that initial year audit costs under mandatory audit firm
rotation would increase by more than twenty percent over subsequent
year costs to acquire the necessary knowledge of the public
company." 196 The GAO survey found that likely annual costs for public
companies to locate potential auditors and provide "support" would
account for approximately seventeen percent of the audit fees during the
189. U.S. Gov'T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 42.
190. Id.
191. See Letter from the Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, supra note 136, at 5.
192. PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, supra note 21, at 2.
193. See Pinnell, supra note 174, at 14-15.
194. See id. at 15.
195. See Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, supra note 171, at 1-2.
196. U.S. Gov'T GEN. ACcoUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 6.
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new auditor's first year of auditing the client.1 97 The AICPA echoes the
concern that increased client costs would arise due to the screening
process for potential audit firms and the education process for new audit
firms regarding the company.
198
Further, there appears to be a reasonable fear of unintended
costs of implementing MAFR arising from the insufficient research into
the effects of implementation.' 99 Among the concerns, commentators
suggest that clients who are suddenly forced to switch auditors may be
lured to lower-quality auditors as "marketing ability [will] trump
technical competence., 20 0 Thus the actual result of MAFR may be the
creation of forced periodic "bidding war[s]" between auditors, so-called
"beauty contests." 201  These "beauty contests" will likely be
characterized by behaviors regulators do not intend to encourage, for
example, auditors underestimating auditing fees to obtain clients and
clients "opinion shopping" for deferential auditors.20 2 So, increased
competition may be sufficient to create "beauty contests" but
insufficient to incentivize auditors to take a "true fresh look. ' 203
Without further research, unintended consequences may result from the
hasty implementation of a MAFR scheme.
5. Rotation will likely not fix the "musical chairs among audit firms" 204
Richard Breeden, former Chairman of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, has not taken a position on whether MAFR
should be implemented, but he provided an interesting discussion on
why MAFR may not be capable of substantially increasing auditor
197. Id.
198. See Letter from the Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, supra note 136,
at 3-4.
199. See Audit Firm Rotation andAudit Quality, supra note 126, at 38-39.
200. Id. at 39.
201. See Karim Jamal, Reviewing Rotation, CAMAGAZINE, June-July 2012, at 36, 37
(questioning whether MAFR will actually promote higher quality audits).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Statement Regarding Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation from
Richard C. Breeden, Former Chairman, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, to
the Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 6 (Mar. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Statement from
Richard C. Breeden], available at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/ps-Breeden.pdf (offering insights
regarding the potential effects of MAFR, though offering no position on the matter).
[Vol. 17
MANDA TOR Y A UDIT FIRM ROTATION
objectivity. 20 5 Breeden highlights the conflict auditing professionals
face, striving both for integrity in their audits and to achieve financial
security for themselves and their firms.206 He argues that these financial
concerns will be expressed in two ways under a system of MAFR.2 °7
First, auditors will be concerned during the beginning of their tenure
with losing the audit engagement.0 8 Second, near the end of their
engagement with the client, the current firm will be spread thinly, as
they seek to secure a new client from the pool up for grabs under the
rotation scheme that year.20 9 The result of this system, as Breeden sees
it, is simple:
Ultimately, rotation would replace one set of somewhat
conflicted partners with another set of partners with the
exact same issue. One group of people would lose their
relationship, while another group would step into their
shoes and have the identical potential conflict .... I
really doubt that objectively levels would rise that much
overall. 10
According to Breeden, unqualified objectivity, in itself, may be
an impossible goal, as an auditor's necessarily close relationship with a
client naturally increases the likelihood that on marginal issues the
auditor will side with the client.21'
V. ALTERNATIVES TO MAFR
The PCAOB's concept release asked commentators to include
their thoughts on alternatives to MAFR, although the release was clearly
focused on the effects of MAFR.212 Commentators responded with
205. See id.
206. Id. at 5-6.
207. Id. at 6.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 6. See also, U.S. GOV'T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 6
("Most Tier 1 firms and Fortune 1000 public companies believe that mandatory audit firm
rotation would not have much effect on the pressures faced by the audit engagement partner
in appropriately dealing with material financial reporting issues.").
211. See Statement from Richard C. Breeden, supra note 204, at 6.
212. See PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, supra note 21, at 1.
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several alternatives to MAFR, among them: a shareholder vote for the
company's audit firm;213 the "comply or explain" model;214 the
"insurance" model;215 and, the shift of emphasis to the audit
committee. 216 Others suggest a phase-in approach would be optimal,
applying MAFR regulations only to select public companies, namely,
(1) those that are "too big to fail" per FDIC designation and (2) every
significant financial institution.217 Additionally, to address the "learning
curve" problem, the concept of a "dual audit" has been floated-
essentially, during the transition year between old and new auditors, the
old audit firm and the new audit firm would be obligated to perform the
audit and report its findings.218 Again, however, the viability of these
alternatives requires further research. Some of the suggested models are
described more fully, as follows.
A. Shareholder Vote
One alternative to MAFR is the "shareholder vote" model.21 9
Under a suggested version of this framework, shareholders would
annually vote on the public company's auditor, with the "Big Four"
audit firms all included on the ballot.220 Theoretically, this would allow
shareholder's to oust firms they believe "see no evil" in the manager's
potentially biased valuations in lieu of auditors that shareholders believe
will accurately assess the health of the company.
22 1
213. See Mark Latham, Proxy Voting Brand Competition, 5 J. OF INV. MGMT. 79, 84
(2007), available at http://votermedia.org/publications/ProxyVotingBrandCompetition.pdf'
214. See Ken Tysiac, PCAOB Panelists Say Mandatory Firm Rotation Could Be
Harmful, Helpful, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY (Mar. 21, 2012),
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com
/Web/20125365.
215. See PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, supra note 21, at 9 (citing Joshua Ronen,
Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-visited, 8 STANFORD J.
OF L., Bus. & FiN. 39, 48 (2002)).
216. See Letter from the Ctr. for Audit Quality, supra note 137, at 3.
217. See Charles A. Bowsher, Auditor independence and Audit Firm Rotation:
Responses to the PCAOB's Concept Release, 82 CPA J. 6, 8 (May 2012).
218. Id.
219. See generally Latham, supra note 213.
220. See id. at 84.
221. Id.
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B. Comply or Explain Model
In examining the "possible middle ground" between no change
to the current regulatory scheme and the implementation of MAFR, the
former Chairman of the SEC, Richard C. Breeden, suggests adoption of
the "comply or explain" model.22 2 As he describes it, the PCAOB
would implement a rebuttable presumption that at the end of a set time
period the audit committee must choose a new audit firm ("comply")
unless it can justify to the PCAOB why the current auditor has not lost
its independence and should continue auditing the client ("explain").223
The model would also require that the PCAOB inspect companies
which meet certain size criteria (essentially, the major companies) and
force rotation if auditor independence is found to be lacking.2 24 If the
company's audit was determined successful by the PCAOB, then the
company could continue with its current audit firm if it (1) completed a
"reproposal" and (2) its proposal was ratified by the company's
shareholders.225 Breeden also briefly addresses the merits of adopting
the "comply and explain" model for auditor independence. 6  For
example, the model's rebuttable presumption that the auditor is no
longer independent would provide incentive for the audit committee to
closely manage the audit process, while not overly circumscribing the
audit committee's power to control its company's auditing process.
227
C. "Future Exemplary Performance Approach"
In his statement to the PCAOB, Professor Henry T.C. Hu
suggested an alternative to MAFR he describes as the "future exemplary
performance approach., 228  The mechanics of the approach have
222. See Statement from Richard C. Breeden, supra note 204, at 8.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 8-9.
226. See id. at 9.
227. See id.
228. See Statement of Henry T.C. Hu, Allan Shivers Chair in the Law of Banking and
Finance, University of Texas at Austin School of Law, to the Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd. Public Meeting on Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation 114-27
(Oct. 18, 2012), available at http://pcaobus.org/Rules/RulemakingfDocket037/2012-10-
18_TranscriptHouston.pdf (offering a theoretical alternative to MAFR based on PCAOB
evaluations of auditor performance).
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striking similarity to the "comply or explain" model. The future
exemplary performance approach rests on two presumptions: (1)
mandatory rotation as proposed is likely "too blunt an instrument," with
its overly rigid, "mechanistic" term limits; 229 and (2) a more nuanced
approach, with emphasis on analyzing individual client-auditor
relationships and information, would likely alleviate some of the
concerns surrounding the MAFR "one-size-fits-all" model. 230  Hu
describes a system where the PCAOB would set a term length with
audit firm rotation required upon the term's expiration unless the
current audit firm receives a waiver from the PCAOB allowing the firm
to continue with its engagement. 23' The PCAOB would determine
whether a waiver is granted by analyzing whether the current auditor, or
another auditor, has "a greater likelihood of delivering truly exemplary
performance" through the duration of the future term.232 To make such
a determination, the PCAOB would use indicia including: (1) the
auditor's past performance for the client in question (and potentially the
firms other clients as well);233 (2) whether the PCAOB finds any
instances of fraud;234 (3) the PCAOB's evaluation of non-public
information regarding the audit;235 and (4) the auditor's evaluation of
the benefits and costs of continuing its audit tenure versus employing a
new auditor.236 Hu argues that in addition to providing a more tailored
237
analysis of the particular auditor's performance, it tempers the
unrealistic assumption that "the grass is always greener on the other side
of the fence, [and] that somehow the new accounting firm will get
everything right.,2 38  Further, it incentivizes the current auditor to
provide superior performance compared to its competitors, especially if
the auditor is subject to removal based on the PCAOB's holistic
evaluation of all of the firm's clients, regardless of the comparative
sizes of the companies. 239 Hu asserts that this model would also foster
229. Id. at 114-15.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 115-16.
232. Id. at 116.
233. Id. at 116-17.
234. Hu, supra note 228, at 117.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 118.
237. See id. at 119-20.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 120.
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active involvement of the audit committee in monitoring its auditor's
performance. 240 The audit committee, in addition to desiring a quality
audit, wants to maintain reasonable costs for the audit.241 Consequently,
the audit committee would prefer ensuring the "exemplary
performance" of the current auditor because rotation would likely be
more expensive.
242
The "insurance model," as the title implies, would require the
public company to obtain insurance against losses due to material
misstatements in their financial statements.243 After the company pays
premiums to the insurance company, the insurance company would then
select and pay for the audit.244 This "financial statement insurance"
(FSI) is beneficial because the public company is no longer directly
paying its auditor-the middle man insurer has taken over this role.245
Arguably, the layer of separation created by having the insurance
company choose and pay the auditor allows the auditor to engage in a
more independent, objective, and skeptical audit of the public company
by requiring management's valuations to be more reliable. 46
D. Refocus on the Audit Committee
The audit committee, in choosing and compensating the audit
firm, insulates company management from the audit firm.247 To bolster
this role of the audit committee, the PCAOB could, among other things,
require the audit committee to receive proposals for replacing the
current auditor and to interview these potential replacements without
initial management involvement.248 Additionally, the audit committee
240. Hu, supra note 228, at 120.
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. See Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP
Re-visited, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 39, 48 (2002-2003).
244. Id.
245. See id. Note that the benefit of this approach is that it may deal with some of the
conflict of interest concerns expressed by the PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, infra note 97,
at 15.
246. Ronen, supra note 243, at 56.
247. See Letter from Deloitte & Touche LLP and Joe Echevarria, CEO, Deloitte LLP,
to the Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 3 (Dec. 8, 2011) available at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/163_DeloitteToucheLLP.pdf
(discussing alternatives to MAFR).
248. Id. at 5.
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could be given greater power to negotiate the audit fee in addition to its
current duty to be the entity that actually pays the audit firm. 24 9 Given
the audit partner rotation that is currently required, the audit committee
could examine the qualifications of potential audit partners prior to
management's involvement, to strengthen the supervising role of the
audit committee over the audit partner. 250 A requirement that the audit
committee provide greater information regarding its oversight of the
audit firm to investors might also promote transparency and allow
investors to meaningfully compare the practices between companies
regarding audit oversight.251
E. Phase-in Approach
Charles A. Bowsher, the former Comptroller General of the
United States, advocates for MAFR for the "Big Four" audit firms
performing audits for large companies. 252  Bowsher argues that the
initial rules should include "between 25 and 40 large companies,"
including "major financial institutions," firms that the FDIC indicates
are "Too Big to Fail," major companies in fields like automotive
manufacturing, etc., and large companies which "appear to have
significant audit and/or accounting problems. 253 Bowsher asserts that
if MAFR is initially restricted to the companies meeting these criteria,
the increased costs associated with MAFR implementation will no
longer be an issue, since the increased cost would still be minimal
compared to the size of the companies and their "overall cost
structure."
254
249. Id. at 6.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See Statement Regarding Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation from
Charles A. Bowsher, Former Comptroller General of the United States, to the Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd. Regarding Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation 2
(Mar. 21, 2012), available at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/ps-Bowsher.pdf (discussing the merits of
MAFR and evaluating the best means of initial implementation of MAFR).
253. Id. at 3-4.
254. Id. at 4.
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F. Dual Audit
Former U.S. Comptroller Bowsher advocates for coupling the
phase-in approach to MAFR with a "dual audit" performed by the
current auditor and the incoming auditor during the term when auditors
are rotated.255 This dual audit would culminate by having both firms
prepare reports for the PCAOB, the Board of Directors, the SEC, and
the public which analyze the financial standing of the company.256
Bowsher believes that the phase-in system paired with the "dual audit"
would alleviate the "learning curve" concerns posed by opponents of
MAFR.257
G. Mandatory Retendering/Mandatory Request for Proposal (RFP)
In her statement to the PCAOB, Karen Nelson suggests
mandatory audit tendering as "a compromise position" to MAFR 1
8
Richard Pozen, though using different terminology, similarly describes
mandatory retendering as a "middle ground" in the debate for and
against MAFR.259 Pozen focuses on the importance of the audit
committee and the need for the company's auditor to place its "loyalty"
with the committee, and to resist pressure from company
management.260 He argues that the PCAOB should mandate that
companies accept bid proposals for the auditor position during a set
period between ten and twenty years.261 Once the audit committee
receives these bid proposals, including the proposal of the current
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Statement Regarding Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation from Karen
Nelson, Harmon Whittington Professor of Accounting and Accounting Area Coordinator,
Jones Graduate School of Business, Rice University, to the Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd. 3 (Oct. 18, 2012), available at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/psNelson%20K.pdf (advocating for
MAFR, but recognizing the potential benefits of the "compromise" offered by mandatory
retendering).
259. See Statement Regarding Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation from
Richard C. Pozen to the Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 1 (Mar. 22, 2012) [hereinafter
Statement from Richard C. Pozen], available at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/psPozen.pdf (arguing for mandatory RFT
or mandatory retendering in lieu of MAFR).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1-2.
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auditor, if provided, the committee would conduct a cost benefit
analysis comparing audit quality to costs for transition to a new firm.
2 62
Pozen asserts that costs incurred through the mandatory bidding
process by the company would likely be offset by more competitive
pricing from the candidate firms. 263 Additionally, he argues that the
prospect of replacement will incentivize the current auditor to perform a
high quality audit for the client because: (1) the auditor does not want to
be replaced, and (2) the auditor knows that another audit firm will
critically analyze their work if they are replaced.264 The audit committee
would benefit from more conscientious performance by the current
auditor, and if the audit committee chooses to replace the auditor, it will
do so with the knowledge of the costs of such a change, and
presumably, the status quo will not be altered if the costs would be
unduly burdensome compared to the perceived benefits. 65
H. "Rigorous Evaluation Process"
266
Kenneth Daly, writing on behalf of the National Association of
Corporate Directors (NACD), argues in his statement to the PCAOB
that rigorous oversight of a company's auditor by the company's audit
committee is a more effective way of increasing auditor "independence,
objectivity and skepticism" than MAFR.267  Though still in its
development, the NACD, along with the CAQ and others, created
evaluation guidelines to aid audit committees in reviewing audit
firms.26 8  The NACD argues that this evaluation process, when
combined with new standards recently issued by the PCAOB and efforts
to promote audit committee "education and awareness," will ensure that
audit committees satisfy their duty of monitoring the company's audit
firm.
2 6 9
262. Id. at 2.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Statement from Richard C. Pozen, supra note 259, at 2.
266. Letter from Kenneth Daly, President & CEO, Nat'l Ass'n of Corp. Directors, to
the Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 3 (Oct. 15, 2012), available at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/ps_.Daly.pdf (asserting that audit
committee's should rigorously evaluate auditors instead of implementing MAFR).
267. Id. at 1.
268. Id. at 3.
269. Id. at 3-4.
[Vol. 17
MANDA TOR Y A UDIT FIRM ROTATION
VI. CONCLUSION
The arguments against MAFR illustrate the burdensome and
costly nature of such reform. If the PCAOB's goal is to truly improve
audit quality and bolster auditor independence, it should consider, based
on the mounting evidence against MAFR, if there are less costly and
more efficient methods of achieving the same goals. Rushing to
implement MAFR as a means of accounting oversight and reform, as
this paper discusses, could have tremendous effects on public
companies, auditors, and shareholders. These changes should not be
undertaken when there is significant evidence against MAFR
implementation and only limited evidence in favor of it.27° Without
convincing evidence that MAFR would improve audit quality, further
action by the PCAOB should be limited to investigating the effects of
recent reforms and the wisdom of future implementation of additional
regulations like MAFR.
SARAH A. CORE
270. See supra Part IV.
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